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The Emporium Case: Title VII Rights
And the Collective Bargaining Process
By ROBERT M. CASSEL*
M AJORITARIAN government by elected exclusive representatives
and correlative protection of minority rights are core elements of Amer-
ica's political system. These concepts were engrafted upon this coun-
try's system of industrial democracy with the passage of the Wagner Act
(NLRA) in 19351 and came into full maturity with its subsequent
amendment and enlargement as the Taft-Hartley Act (LMRA) in
1947.2
In the three decades following the passage of the Wagner Act,
American labor was preoccupied with defining the rights of employees
to form and join labor organizations and utilize effectively such organi-
zations in negotiating terms of employment. It was also during
this period that the basic rights and obligations of labor organizations
and employers were defined not only in reciprocal terms, but also in
terms of each party's relations with members and employees respec-
tively.' Issues of discrimination were seen as primarily involving the
methods used by employers to discourage the formation of, or mem-
bership in, labor organizations. 4  The rights of racial minorities within
the minority union movement were not ignored, but were scrutinized,
in the main, to guarantee that allegations of discrimination were not
* A.B., 1956, University of Michigan; J.D., University of California, Berkeley.
Member, California Bar.
1. 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
2. 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
3. The Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), further amended the Taft-
Hartley Act and added a large number of new regulations pertaining to internal union
affairs.
4. Employees who opted for representation by labor organizations were, as they
continue to be, clearly in the minority. In 1972, union membership was estimated to
be 19,435,000, roughly 21.8% of the United States labor force. See U.S. BtntAu OF
LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EMPLOYuS'
USSOCIATONS (1973).
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being employed to taint unionization and also to ensure that elected
union officials fully and fairly represented all employees within the bar-
gaining unit. 5
Viewed in this context, protection of minority rights was essential
both for the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA 6
and for the preservation of the integrity of the collective bargaining
process. Of course, the Constitution and legislative enactments pro-
vided independent bases for various minority economic rights, 7 but the
primary impetus for minority right protection stemmed from the need
to develop cohesive and collective employee bargaining strength. Such
power could only be realized by forming homogeneous and self-govern-
ing units which would seek the improvement of the working conditions
of all employees. The foundation of employee power conceived in the
collective bargaining system was thus consolidation of all employees un-
der the leadership of the exclusive representative of the majority.
As the last decade unfolded, it became clear that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19648 offered a new source of individual economic
power that, if properly applied, could serve the interests of minorities in
much the same way as union representation under the collectivist
scheme of the NLRA. Not only does Title VII contain the parallel rem-
edies of back pay and reinstatemen for discriminatory employer prac-
5. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R.1L, 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
6. Section 7 of the LRRM provides as follows: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3)." 61 Stat. 140 (1947).
7. E.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, XIV; Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1970); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970); Civil Rights Act of
1964, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. 11, 1972).
The most significant of these provisions is, of course, Title VII of the 1964 Act, which
became effective in 1965. For a legislative history of the 1866 and 1870 Acts, see Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-44 (1968).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. II, 1972).
9. "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is in-
tentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the
court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by
the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible
for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate." Id. § 706(g), 78 Stat. 261 (1964), as amended, 86 Stat. 104 (1972); cf.
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tices, but it has several other major advantages. Putative discriminatees
have no need to be concerned about the effect their claims might have
on the rights of other group members or the union's bargaining strat-
egy. 10 In addition, Title VII provides direct access to the employer
without the intercession of union representatives or arbitrators selected
in part by the allegedly discriminating employer for the purpose of con-
tract interpretation. Moreover, Title VII provides individual grievants
with the opportunity to select their own attornies and to receive an
award of attorneys' fees in successful cases. 1 ' Lastly, Title VII class ac-
tions brought under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure'
are not decided solely on the facts of the individual's complaint and
therefore may result in class-wide relief against employers and unions.
While in some cases individual employee Title VII actions have
been compatible with the collective interests represented by the labor
organization,13 it was inevitable that there would be serious conflicts
NLRA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). Legislative history indicates that these
remedies were deliberately borrowed from the NLRA. See 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey); H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1963).
See also Comment, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HARv. L.R nv. 1109, 1260 (1971).
Although the statutory language refers to conduct "intentionally" engaged in by the
respondent, the cases have made it clear that all that need be established is that the em-
ployment practices at issue were not accidental. The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., specifically directed the focus of Title VII remedies to the consequences of
alleged unlawful practices, rather than the motivation behind them. "Good intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated
to measuring job capability." 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
10. Of course, it was assumed that in cases where the individual's allegation ap-
peared to be meritorious, they would be fully supported by the union.
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 706(k), 78 Stat. 261 (1964). The stat-
utory provision for recovery of attorney's fees also prompted their frequent inclusion in
out of court settlements. E.g., Wells v. Bank of America, No. C-71409 (N.D. Cal. May
30, 1974).
12. FED. R. Cwv. P. Rule 23(a) provides, "One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so nu-
merous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Rule 23(b) (2) provides, "An
action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition . . . (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunc-
tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. . ....
13. For example, discharge cases frequently involve employee allegations that per-
formance deficiencies relied upon by the employer were merely a pretext and that the
discharge was, in reality, racially motivated.
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between the self-interest of minority employees and the collective in-
terests of the group. It was also clear that these conflicts would lead
to difficult choices for the employers, the unions, the courts, and the
National Labor Relations Board. The collision of these interests has
led to two Supreme Court decisions which demand careful considera-
tion.
The Alexander and Emporium Decisions
In February 1974, the Supreme Court announced its unanimous
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,14 which implicitly sup-
ported an emerging body of board law15 that accorded special treatment
to Title VII allegations. In holding that a trial de novo under Title
VII is not foreclosed to a plaintiff who had previously submitted his
claim of racial discrimination to final and binding arbitration under the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement containing a nondis-
crimination clause, the Court declared:
Title VII strictures are absolute and represent a congressional com-
mand that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of
necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective
bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.16
The Court was equally unambiguous in its statement of the dis-
tinction between rights that had been "conferred upon employees col-
lectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be ex-
ercised or relinquished by the Union as collective bargaining agent to
obtain economic benefits for unit members" 17 and Title VII which
"on the other hand, stands on plainly different ground; it concerns not
majoritarial process, but an individual's right to equal employment op-
portunities. '"18
Having refused to sacrifice Title VII rights on the sacred altar of
arbitration in Alexander, the Court could have been expected to ad-
vance further the primacy of Title VII rights over those rights provided
by the NLRA in Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Organization.'9
14. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
15. E.g., Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323
(1974); NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, enf. denied,
82 L.R.R.M. 2608 (1973).
16. 415 U.S. at 51 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975).
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The Court, however, without so much as a backward glance at its
pronouncements of a year before, pledged its full allegiance to the col-
lective bargaining process. Specifically, the Court held that minority
employees are not entitled to the protection of section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA when they bypass their union representative and engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of bargaining directly with their em-
ployer over matters of alleged racial discrimination.
Although the factual situation of Emporium more nearly resem-
bled the devious mischief of a professor of advanced labor law than
the real lives of two black department store employees, an understand-
ing of the unusual events in the Emporium case is essential to any at-
tempt to harmonize the holdings of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and
Emporium and to understand their future significance.
Facts of the Emporium Case20
The Emporium-Capwell Company operates a large department
store in downtown San Francisco. The company, through its mem-
bership in the Retailer's Council, was party to a collective bar-
gaining agreement with the Department Store Employees' Union,
which covered the company's stock and marketing employees. The
contract contained a broad nondiscrimination clause, plus grievance,
binding arbitration, and no-strike provisions.
A group of employees covered by the contract met with a union
representative in April 1968 and complained that the company discrim-
inated against racial minorities in work assignments and promotions. A
union committee was appointed to study the assertions. A report was
thereafter submitted to the company in which the seriousness of the
charges was emphasized and specific examples of alleged racial dis-
crimination were cited.
Company representatives agreed to cooperate with the union and
to investigate the charges. Several months later a second meeting be-
tween the union and employees was held in which evidence of the al-
leged discriminatory practices was discussed and recorded. In attend-
ance were representatives of the state and federal equal employment
agencies and local antipoverty agency. The following day the union
formally charged the company with discrimination, invoked the griev-
20. Statements of facts may be found in The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 179-
83, rev'd sub nom. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 919-
24 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Org., 95 S. Ct. 977, 980-82 (1975).
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ance procedures of the contract, and advised that it was prepared to
proceed to arbitration if necessary to obtain relief for the individual
grievants. Certain employees who were present at this second meet-
ing expressed a preference for direct picketing against the company,
but were informally advised by union and agency representatives to ad-
here to the contractual procedures for dispute resolution.
As specified in the collective bargaining agreement, a Union-Man-
agement Adjustment Board was convened to hear the charges. At the
first meeting of this body, four employees, including James Joseph Hol-
lins and Tom Hawkins, refused to serve as witnesses. In addition, Hol-
lins read a statement demanding that they be allowed to talk to the
company president to try to reach an agreement with him to straighten
out the problems and conditions of the Emporium, 2 after which they
left the hearing and failed to attend a second meeting held two days
later. Thereafter, Hollins sought out the company president but was
referred to the personnel director with whom he had previously dis-
cussed the grievances. Hollins elected not to talk again to the person-
nel director, but, instead, he and others held a press conference on Oc-
tober 22, 1968, at which a leaflet was read denouncing the company's
employment policies in strident and vitriolic terms.22
21. A finding of fact that is crucial to the Court's decision is that Hollins and
Hawkins had demanded to bargain with the company president and had not merely
sought to present individual grievances. The trial examiner specifically found that
"[tfhe evidence further establishes that this was no mere presentation of a grievance
but nothing short of a demand that the Respondent bargain with the picketing employees
for the entire group of minority employees. This is shown by Hollins' meeting with
Respondent's president, Batchelder, in which he told the latter that he wanted to 'discuss
what was happening among minority employees'; his later insistence that those picketing
would be satisfied with nothing less than a meeting with Batchelder; and Hawkins' testi-
mony that those picketing were seeking to 'talk to the top management to get better con-
ditions for The Emporium,' that those picketing were seeking to accomplish their ob-
jectives through 'group talk and through the president if we could talk to him.' It is
further clear that the Respondent never refused to have an informal discussion with these
employees and referred them to Respondent's personnel director for such discussions,
and that they scorned such talks and insisted on negotiating directly with Batchelder."
192 N.L.R.B. at 185-86.
Footnote 2 of the trial examiner's decision should also be noted carefully: "Hawk-
ins testified that Hollins said that they would not testify as individuals but only as a
group whose main purpose was to talk to the Respondent's president and to reach an
agreement with him on conditions at the Emporium; that they wanted to talk to the pres-
ident or to no one." Id. at 181 n.2 (emphasis in original).
22. The handbill read as follows:
"* * BEWARE * * * * BEWARE * *
* * BEWARE * *
EMPoRIUM SHOPPERS
Boycott Is On Boycott Is On Boycott Is On
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On Saturday, November 2, 1968, Hollins, Hawkins and two others
distributed, on their own time, copies of the leaflet in front of the store
and urged a public boycott of the store. At that time, they were en-
couraged by a union representative to utilize the contractual grievance
procedures and admonished that they could be fired for their conduct.
Hollins refused to follow this advice and renewed his demand to meet
with the company president. The following Thursday Hollins and
Hawkins were warned in writing that if they repeated their prior hand-
billing activities they would be fired.23
Two days later, Hollins and Hawkins, ignoring the warnings, re-
sumed their boycott activities. As a result, they were discharged the
following week. The union protested the discharge but did not file
unfair labor practice charges. Such charges were filed with the board,
however, by the Western Addition Community Organization, a local
civil rights association, of which both employees were members.
These charges resulted in a complaint being filed by the board.
"For years at The Emporium black, brown, yellow and red people have worked at
the lowest jobs, at the lowest levels. Time and time again we have seen intelligent, hard
working brothers and sisters denied promotions and respect.
" e Emporium is a 20th Century colonial plantation. The brothers and sisters
are being treated the same way as our brothers are being treated in the slave mines of
Africa.
"Whenever the racist pig at The Emporium injures or harms a black sister or
brother, they injure and insult all black people. THE EMPORIUM MUST PAY FOR
THESE INSULTS. Therefore, we encourage all of our people to take their money out
of this racist store, until black people have full employment and are promoted justly
through out [sic] The Emporium.
"We welcome the support of our brothers and sisters from the churches, unions, so-
rorities, fraternities, social clubs, Afro-American institute, Black Panther Party, WACO
and the Poor People's Institute." 95 S. CL at 981 n.2.
23. "The warning given to Hollins read:
"'On October 22, 1968, you issued a public statement at a press conference to
which all newspapers, radio, and TV stations were invited. The contents of this state-
ment were substantially the same as those set forth in the sheet attached. This state-
ment was broadcast on Channel 2 on October 22, 1968 and Station KDIA.
"'On November 2nd you distributed copies of the attached statement to Negro cus-
tomers and prospective customers, and to other persons passing by in front of The Em-
porium.
"'These statements are untrue and are intended to and will, if continued, injure the
reputation of The Emporium.
"'There are ample legal remedies to correct any discrimination you may claim to
exist. Therefore, we view your activities as a deliberate and unjustified attempt to injure
your employer.
"'This is to inform you that you may be discharged if you repeat any of the above
acts or make any similar public statement.'
'That given to Hawkins was the same except that the first paragraph was not in-
cluded." Id. at 982 n.4.
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Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner
In April 1969, a hearing before a trial examiner 4 was held con-
cerning the complaint. The trial examiner had no difficulty finding
that Hollins and Hawkins believed in good faith that the company had
been engaged in discriminatory practices, since that was both the
known official position of the union and the widespread belief among
other company employees. A finding as to whether the company had
in fact discriminated was expressly reserved, since that issue was not
litigated. Noting that Holins and Hawkins had frustrated the contrac-
tual grievance procedures of the contract against the advice of the
union and had been advised by the union that their boycott activities
were illegal, the trial examiner rejected the notion that Hollins and
Hawkins were implementing or strengthening the union's position.
Moreover, the trial examiner observed that the union was
endeavoring in every way available to it under the agreement to
adjust any and all cases of racial discrimination brought to its at-
tention . . . . It is also evident that it was prepared to resort to
arbitration to enforce its position that racial discrimination in con-
ditions of employment existed in Respondent's store, and it was
handicapped in proceeding by reason of the four employees' refusal
to assist or be represented by the Union in the matter.25
Finding that Hollins and Hawkins had not been engaged in merely
presenting a grievance, but rather that they had demanded separate
bargaining over the employment conditions of minorities at the store,
the trial examiner concluded that the board's complaint should be dis-
missed. This recommendation was based on findings that Hollins's and
Hawkins's activities had (1) undermined the union's efforts to obtain
improved conditions for minority employees and (2) imposed upon the
company the unreasonable burden of responding to the bargaining de-
mands of self-designated minority group representatives while trying to
abide by the collective bargaining agreement, and the demands of the
union as majority representative.2 6
In reaching this conclusion, it was clear that, to a large extent, the
trial examiner had been faced with inchoate and conflicting judicial
precedent. It was true, of course, that concerted activities for the pur-
pose of improving working conditions were protected, in general terms,
by section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.27  When minority issues had become
24. Trial examiners are now designated administrative law judges.
25. 192 N.L.R.B. at 185.
26. Id. at 186.
27. Section 8(a) (1) of the act states, "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
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involved in the exercise of section 7 rights,28 the courts had held that
employers could not use racial slurs to disparage labor organizations.
29
Although the board and the courts had also fashioned standards gov-
erning the union's duty of fair representation,30 these standards allowed
unions rather broad discretion in determining the methods by which
minority grievances should be pursued. 3
The degree to which the exclusive representative status of a ma-
jority union that was not in breach of its duty of fair representation pre-
empted concerted activities aimed at improvement of minority employ-
ment conditions had proven to be a nettlesome issue for the board and
the courts. A number of circuits, 2 following the Fourth Circuit's lead
in NLRB v. Draper Corp.,3 held that employee actions directed against
the employer that were not authorized by the union were not protected.
Other circuits adopted the approach utilized in Western Contracting v.
NLRB,3 4 which protected employee conduct in support of the union's
actual or presumed objectives even though such conduct was not spe-
cifically authorized by the union.35 The Ninth Circuit opted for the
Draper test in NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd.,36 which was decided
after the trial examiner's decision in Emporium, and reaffirmed its ad-
herence to this position in a 1972 case37 with a factual situation some-
what similar to that of Emporium.
There are, however, important distinctions between the Draper
and Western Contracting lines of cases and the Emporium decision.
employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7 ....... NLRB § 8(a)(1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as
amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947).
28. See note 6 supra.
29. See Planters Mfg. Co., 10 N.L.R.B. 735 (1938), enforced, 105 F.2d 750 (4th
Cir. 1939).
30. See Steele v. Louisville & N.R.RL, 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Independent Metal
Workers, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962); enf. denied on other
grounds, 336 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
31. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964).
32. For a recent and thorough analysis of the development of the law in this area,
see Craver, Minority Action Versus Union Exclusivity: The Need to Harmonize NLRA
and Title VII Policies, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 33-39 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Craver].
33. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
34. 332 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963).
35. NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964). The Fifth Circuit
later retreated from the approach of Western Contracting when its full implications be-
came apparent. See NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).
37. NLRB v, Universal Services, Inc. & Assoc., 467 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1972).
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For example, concerted activity at issue in Emporium was based upon
minority employee claims that the employer had violated their Title VII
right of nondiscriminatory employment. And, unlike Tanner, the dis-
charged employees had sought the assistance of the union in resolving
their racial grievances before engaging in unauthorized activities
against the employer.
The Decision of the NLRB
When the trial examiner's decision was reviewed by the board,
a majority, composed of members Miller, Fanning, and Kennedy,
adopted the trial examiner's decision on the ground that, by abandoning
the contractual grievance procedure and seeking to initiate direct nego-
tiations with the employer, Hollins and Hawkins had undermined the
efforts of the designated exclusive bargaining representative. Further-
more, the board majority refused to assume as findings of fact either
that the employer had engaged in discriminatory practices or that the
union had breached its duty of fair representation."'
Two members dissented from the majority's position. Board
member Brown rejected the trial examiner's finding that Hollins and
Hawkins had sought to negotiate terms and conditions of employment
with the company and concluded instead that they sought only to sub-
mit their grievances to their employer, a right specifically protected by
the NLRA. 9 Board member Jenkins dissented on grounds that fore-
shadows the opinion of the D. C. Circuit in this case. While acknowl-
edging that a union is often called upon to balance competing employee
interests, he would not allow it to compromise legitimate employee in-
terests and thereby frustrate indiviudal efforts to vindicate such rights
and interests. Returning to the principles first enunciated in Steele v.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad,40 requiring the union to represent all
employees fairly and without discrimination, he argued that the union
forfeits its rights of exclusive representation whenever it breaches this
duty by permitting the existence of discriminatory practices. More-
over, Jenkins asserted that the employee's right to be free of unlawful
38. 192 N.L.R.B. at 173 n.2.
39. Id. at 178-79 (Brown, A.L.J., dissenting). Section 9(a) of the NLRA pro-
vides in pertinent part "[t]hat any individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as
the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or
agreement then in effect ...... 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 143 (1947).
40. 323 U.S. 192 (1944),
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discrimination, arising from the Constitution and not the NLRA, is ab-
solute and transcends not only the union's right to exclusivity of rep-
resentation, but the entire collective bargaining process.41 The appli-
cation by the board of principles of union exclusivity to the disadvan-
tage of minority employees therefore constituted, in his view, a denial
of the employees' right to equal protection of the law.
Decision of the D. C. Circuit
The D. C. Circuit42 refused to enforce the board's decision, rea-
soning that the right to be free of discrimination in employment does
not arise from the NLRA or the collective bargaining agreement, but
rather has separate statutory bases derived from the Constitution.48
This right therefore differs significantly from the other rights created
and protected by the NLRA. The court conceded that Hollins and Haw-
kins were seeking to bargain with the company and that, by doing so,
they interfered with, and rendered ineffective, the methods selected by
the union, but it deemed such interference an insufficient basis for
withdrawing the protection of the NLRA. 4
While substantially agreeing with board member Jenkins, the
court was not persuaded that the right to be free of employment dis-
crimination is absolute and totally independent of the NLRA. Since
national labor policy favors the use of grievance-arbitration procedures
to settle labor disputes and since the record does not indicate bad faith
representation by the union, the court held that minority employees
must submit their grievances to the union before engaging in concerted
activity against the employer.4 5 Nevertheless, this requirement cannot
be allowed to stifle requests for individual bargaining where reasonable
grounds exist for minority employees to believe that their method
would be more successful.
Thus, the Labor Board should inquire, in cases such as this,
whether -the union was actually remedying the discrimination to the
fullest extent possible, by the most expedient and efficiacious
means. Where the union's efforts fall short of this high standard,
the minority group's concerted activities cannot lose its section 7
protection.46
41. 192 N.L.R.B. at 175. Member Jenkins argued further that the good faith ef-
forts of the union could not be given weight, since it might lack the capability and re-
sources to accomplish the eradication of discriminatory practices. Id. at 177.
42. 485 F.2d 917 (1973).
43. Id. at 927.
44. Id. at 929.
45. Id. at 931.
46. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Judge Wyzanski dissented 47 from the majority opinion. In agree-
ment with the position taken by board member Jenkins, he would ex-
empt racial issues from other collective bargaining issues over which
the unions are granted exclusivity of representation and permit minority
employees to engage in independent bargaining.
The Decision of the United States Supreme Court
In a strikingly pragmatic decision, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the D. C. Circuit, 8 ignoring the obvious frailties of the
lower court's test49 as well as the subtle and labyrinthian arguments ad-
vanced by the parties. 0  The rationale of the board majority was
wholly adopted:
The policy of industrial self-determination as expressed in § 7
does not require fragmentation of the bargaining unit along racial
or other lines in order to consist with the national labor policy
against discrimination. And in the face of such fragmentation,
whatever its effect on discriminatory practices, the bargaining proc-
ess that the principle of exclusive representation is meant to lubri-
cate could not endure unhampered. 51
Although the Court noted the "unique status" rationale advanced
by board member Jenkins and Judge Wyzanski, who had insisted that
a minority's right to bargain with an employer over alleged discrimina-
tion is absolute, it rejected that approach in favor of a direct examina-
tion of the implicit practical considerations.
[I]t is far from clear that separate bargaining is necessary to help
eliminate discrimination. Indeed, as the facts of this case demon-
strate, the proposed remedy might have just the opposite effect
. .. . With each group able to enforce its conflicting demands-
47. Id. at 932.
48. 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975), rev'g 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
49. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
50. The board, for example, had argued in its brief to the Court that if each racial
minority was permitted to bargain with the employer, it might well insist upon its own
bargaining representative and this in turn would lead to a violation of section 703 (c) (2)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful for a labor organization "to
limit, segregate, or classify its membership [on the basis of] race, color, [etc.]." Brief
for the NLRB at 24-25, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org.,
95 S. Ct. 977 (1975). The board also alleged that Hollins's and Hawkins's activities
were, in essence, picketing for recognitional purposes contrary to section 8(b) (7) (A)
of the NLRA, which bars such picketing where the employer has lawfully recognized
another labor organization. Id. at 37-39. And, finally, the board contended that by
insisting that the company's president, rather than its personnel director, meet with them
to discuss working conditions, the minority employees had also violated section 8(b) (1)(B) of the act, which makes it unlawful for a union to restrain or coerce an employer
in the choice of its collective bargaining representatives. Id. at 39 n.19.
51. 95 S. Ct. at 989.
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the incumbent employees by resort to contractual processes and the
minority employees by economic coercion-the probability of
strife and deadlock is high; the likelihood of making headway
against discriminatory practices would be minimal.52
Notwithstanding arguments that existing procedures under either Title
VII or the NLRA are unduly time consuming or inadequate, and de-
spite the assertion that the integrity of Title VII would be compromised
if not subsumed under section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, the Court re-
fused to allow Title VII claims precedence "at the expense of the or-
derly collective-bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA."' 5
The analysis of the sole dissenter, Mr. Justice Douglas, is reminis-
cent of the decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver." Though Hol-
lins and Hawkins may have had a cause of action against their union
for breach of its duty of fair representation, "as the law on that phase
of the problem has evolved it would seem that the burden on the em-
ployee is heavy."55  Moreover, they might have filed charges against
the employer under section 704(a) of Title VII, which course of action
would have protected their self-help activities. Notwithstanding the
availability of this remedy and the failure of petitioners to seek it, the
majority erred, asserted Justice Douglas, in withholding protection under
the act on the basis of the principle of exclusive representation em-
bodied in section 9 of the NLRA.
Citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Justice Douglas reminded
his brethren that Title VIs strictures are absolute and independent
from majoritarian processes.5" Noting that employees might reason-
ably be required to approach the union prior to independent action,
Justice Douglas argued that once it becomes apparent that the union
response is inadequate under the D. C. Circuit's test, minority groups
may proceed independently since "union conduct can be oppressive
even if not made in bad faith." 7 Thus, in his view, the D. C. Circuit's
opinion should have been affirmed.
It is curious, and perhaps significant, to note that neither the board
in its brief to the Court, nor the Court in its decision in Emporium,
addressed the constitutional arguments that board member Jenkins and
52. Id. at 986, 989.
53. ld. at 988.
54. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
55. 95 S. Ct. at 990 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 991.
57. Id. Justice Douglas also noted that "[t]he inertia of weak-kneed, docile union
leadership can be as devastating to the cause of racial equality as aggressive subversion."
Id.
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Judge Wyzanski had found so persuasive and which had been equally
convincing to the board in Bekins Moving & Storage Co. 58  Moreover,
neither the board nor the Court's opinions made reference to the ex-
panding expertise of the board "to make findings of fact concerning
the existence of discrimination and to develop standards for determin-
ing the scope of Title VII protection. . . ."" This expertise has been
employed in deciding employer challenges to board certification of al-
legedly discriminatory unions under section 9(c) of the NLRA follow-
ing Bekins and the employer defense of union discrimination in re-
sponse to charges of employer refusal to bargain pursuant to section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA, as interpreted by the Eighth Circuit in NLRB
v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.6" On the contrary, the
board argued in its brief that it is not the most appropriate body to
make such findings. 61
Whatever the future may hold for the Board's Bekins and Mansion
House procedures, it is clear that the board and the Court have, in Em-
porium, declined to recognize Title VII as requiring expansion of
NLRA protection for concerted activities based on claims of actual dis-
criminatory practices by the employer. Moreover, there is no hint in
either the board's argument to the Court, or the opinion itself, that
either a reasonable belief, or the actual presence, of racial discrimina-
tion-whether by employers or unions-will be regarded as sufficient
justification for dissident minorities to bypass their exclusive represen-
tative and to receive the protection of the NLRA when they engage
in concerted activities to force direct bargaining with the employer.
Thus, vindication of the individualistic precepts of Title VII, to the ex-
tent they threaten the majoritarian underpinnings of the collective bar-
gaining process, will be relegated by Emporium to the courts through
58. 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1974). "To decline to lend governmental sponsorship
and approval to [a discriminating union seeking certification as a bargaining unit] is
not to 'eliminate the institution of collective bargaining' or to 'throw out the baby with
the bath,' but is only to recognize our obligation to construe our statute in light of the
Constitution and thus to grant the power of exclusive representation only to a labor or-
ganization which has not shown open disregard for its duty to represent all employees
without invidious discrimination. The union and its members have it within their power
to meet this obligation by eliminating the discrimination, if it has occurred in the past,
before-not after-coming to this Agency to seek a federally conferred certificate. ...
[Als an agency of the Federal Government, we are constitutionally prohibited from
using our power. . . to support.. . any. . . organization shown.. . to have engaged
in invidious discrimination." Id.
59. Brief for the NLRB at 21-22, 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975).
60. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
61. Brief for the NLRB at 21-22, 95 S. Ct. 977 (1975).
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Title VII procedures. At the very least, this remedy relieves the board
from being torn between conflicting and equally compelling policy con-
siderations.
Harmonizing Emporium and Alexander
It is indeed difficult to harmonize the holding of the Supreme
Court in Emporium with the language of Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co. However, beyond rhetorical discrepancies in the cases, there
are unifying coordinates that are helpful in charting the direction of the
development of Title VII law in relationship to the collective bargain-
ing process.
Collective Versus Individual Bargaining
The genius of our national labor policy is clearly the system of
collective bargaining by elected or selected majority representatives.
Whatever its pitfalls, few experienced labor practitioners would wish to
return to the nineteenth century system of individual contracts of em-
ployment. The American system has been comparatively successful in
bringing peace and stability to labor management relations through a
statutory process that fosters the equalization of bargaining power."
The NLRA expressly encourages the formation of employee labor or-
ganizations to balance the economic power concentrated in employers
organized in corporate, and now multinational, business entities.
Therefore, individual bargaining efforts that undermine the union's
status as exclusive representative necessarily detract from its ability to
achieve through the collective bargaining process objectives common
to all bargaining unit employees.
The Emporium case presented a threat to the fundamental prin-
ciples of majoritarian collective bargaining, 3 a threat not evident in the
62. The scriptures of section one of the NLRA are all too often forgotten or ig-
nored. The congressional findings and policies incorporated in the act are clearly
stated: "The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and af-
fects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by pre-
venting the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and
between industries." NLRA § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
While in some quarters, critics proclaim that the balance of power has been tipped
heavily in favor of organized labor, statistics reflecting union membership belie this con-
tention. See note 4 supra.
63. This conclusion is predicated on the proposition that Hollins and Hawkins
were seeking to enter into a bargaining relationship with the company, as opposed to
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factual context of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. The decision in
Emporium can therefore be interpreted as holding that individuals will
not be granted separate bargaining status, whatever abridgement of
rights is asserted, if the majoritarian precepts of the NLRA will be sub-
stantially undermined. Individual rights cannot be given preference to
the ultimate detriment of all employees who rely upon the NLRA for
the protection of their collective interests. The issues presented in
Alexander, on the other hand, while involving very significant implica-
tions for the arbitration process, did not strike at the very cornerstones
of the collective bargaining system.
Collective Bargaining and Arbitration Compared
The primary collective bargaining issue in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co. was the extent to which the right to pursue Title VII rem-
edies was prospectively waived by operation of the grievance-arbitra-
tion provisions of a union agreement. The Court reserved judgment
on the possible effects of express waivers64 and the weight to be ac-
corded an arbitrator's decision involving Title VII issues.6 5 While
Alexander will clearly have an inhibiting effect upon the use of arbitra-
tion in Title VII matters arising under collective bargaining agree-
simply clearing the air or presenting grievances. The validity of this premise, however,
is not all that clear from the case (see note 21 supra) and was rejected entirely by board
member Brown: 'There is not a scintilla of proof that the picketing employees wanted
discussions leading to agreements on new conditions of employment, or even a modifica-
tion of existing ones, or even to effect a compromise of the grievances. In short, the
employees did not picket Respondent for the purpose of negotiating an agreement but
simply to urge Respondent to take action to correct conditions of racial discrimination
which the employees reasonably believed existed at the Emporium." 192 N.L.R.B. at
179 (dissent).
64. The Court, however, noted that "an employee [presumably could] waive his
cause of action under Title VII as a part of a voluntary settlement ...... 415 U.S.
36, 52 (1974).
65. "We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision,
since this must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the col-
lective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of
procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue
of discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbi-
tral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may
properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one
of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis
of an adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting
Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution
of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full avail-
ability of this forum." Id. at 59 n.21.
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ments, the impact of the decision upon the arbitration process is of a
substantially different magnitude than the threat posed to the collective
bargaining process by the minority's contentions in Emporium. More-
over, definitive decisions on the issues expressly reserved in Alexander
could regenerate impetus for arbitration of Title VII claims arising un-
der collective bargaining agreements. More importantly, since the ar-
bitation process has a utility to the collective bargaining parties as a
method of resolving labor disputes without resort to the devastating ef-
fects of strikes and lockouts,66 it should survive as a useful process even
if completely shunned by parties enmeshed in Title VII disputes. Fur-
ther, even if the effect of Alexander were to eliminte arbitration com-
pletely from labor contracts, the collective bargaining process would re-
main viable. 7
The Court's rather overstated reflections upon the "unique status"
of Title VII rights in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver65 must be read,
therefore, in the light of their practical effect upon critical substantive
issues. Permitting resort to both arbitration and the courts in Title VII
cases may not be as supportive of the collective bargaining process as
the Alexander Court believed, but it hardly threatens to dismember
the process by allowing individual minority bargaining. It was this
threat, with its potential for undermining the effectiveness of the exclu-
sive representative of the employees, that loomed so large in Em-
porium.
The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
The central theme of both Emporium and Alexander is the
struggle to come to grips with the role of the union in the resolution
of Title VII grievances. In neither case were the employers found to
have engaged in discriminatory practices, yet in both cases the em-
ployee petitioners alleged, in effect, that the unions could not be relied
upon to vindicate their Title VII rights.69 Of paramount significance
66. See Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Market, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
67. There is, for example, a small but notable number of collective bargaining
agreements which do not contain binding arbitration provisions. A corresponding num-
ber of employer and union parties, therefore, apparently find no intrinsic relationsihp
between the collective bargaining process and arbitration. "In a study reported in 1970,
unresolved grievances were committed to arbitration in 94% of then current contracts,
an actual decrease of 2% in the percentage reported in 1966." BNA, LABOR RELA-
TONS YEARBOOK 38 (1970).
68. See notes 16-18 supra.
69. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Court stated, "At the arbitration
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in both cases, however, is the fact that instead of bringing charges un-
der the NLRA or Title VII against the union involved, the employee
petitioners sought redress solely from their employers. Although the
alleged failings of the unions were the theoretical predicates for the peti-
tioners' claims, the remedies ordered would, of necessity, have had to
have been directed solely against the employers. Even assuming that
all discrimination is systemic in nature and, consequently, that employ-
ers and unions always share joint responsibility, a remedy directed at
only the employer seems inequitable.
The opinion of the D. C. Circuit in Emporium poses the dilemma
squarely. The court would have the board measure the liability of the
employer for back pay and reinstatement by the extent to which the
union "was actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest extent
possible, by the most expedient and efficacious means. '7 The Supreme
Court's approach in Emporium obviated the necessity for examining the
patent vagueness of this standard; indeed, it remains uncertain how the
board could have determined whether a union had used the "most ex-
pedient and efficacious means."
If the determination were based upon the extent of the union's
efforts, some guidelines for measuring those efforts would have to be
formulated. Yet the question would remain: how much more effort
is required than that employed by the union in the Emporium case?
On the other hand, if results were to be the key criterion for the board
to judge union efforts, ascertaining the sufficiency of the results would
present formidable problems. Even if a truly objective standard based
upon the presence of actual unlawful discrimination were applied, the
daily shifts in hiring and promotion and the less frequent effects of con-
tract negotiations would seriously hamper the determination of compli-
ance with Title VII at any specific time.
In addition both unions and employers would have been faced
with practically insoluble dilemmas under the D. C. Circuit's test. For
example, how would a union resolve disputes between various minority
groups with respect to the means advocated by each to remedy discrim-
hearing on November 20, 1969, petitioner [Alexander] testified that his discharge was
the result of racial discrimination and informed the arbitrator that he had filed a charge
with the Colorado Commission because he 'could not rely on the union.'" 415 U.S.
at 42. In Emporium, the board observed, "Unable to have the issue of racial discrimi-
nation as they viewed it processed by the Union as a single issue affecting all employees
belonging to minority races, Hollins attempted to present his views in the matter to Re-
spondent's president, Batchelder." 192 N.L.R.B. at 181.
70. 485 F.2d at 931 (emphasis in original).
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ination? For the employer, the problems would be multi-faceted.
When faced with requests by one or more self-structured minority
groups for direct negotiations, backed by the threat of immediate strike
activity, the employer would need information regarding the methods
the union had been implementing to eliminate alleged discrimination.
Yet access to such information would, most likely, be quite restricted.
If, in response to a request by the employer, the union were to refuse
to disclose its methods or to affirm that it had used the most expedient
means to eliminate discrimination, what would be the required course of
action for the employer? If the board later determined that the union
had not lived up to such a claim, the employer's liability for back pay
could, conceivably, shift to the union, but this would not necessarily be
the outcome. If, on the other hand, the union admitted doing less, it
would invite litigation and the loss of bargaining rights under other
board doctrines. 71
This sample of issues raised by the decision of the D. C. Circuit
in Emporium illustrates the defects of an approach that measures the
employer's liability by the quality of the union's performance. Thus,
a framework which would allow resolution of Title VII grievances
among the parties and provide liability commensurate with responsi-
bility, is necessary.
Alternative Approaches
Actual Discrimination by a Labor Organization
An alternative approach to accommodating minority rights and the
collective bargaining process has been suggested, 72 pursuant to which
the right of dissident minorities to engage in separate bargaining and
in conduct unauthorized by a union would receive protection when the
union has in fact violated its duty of fair representation. Reasoning
by analogy to section 502 of the LMIA,73 which protects employee
71. See NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th
Cir. 1973). In Mansion House, the court refused to enforce a board order requiring
an employer to bargain with the union on the basis that the trial examiner had failed
to admit into evidence facts concerning unlawful discriminatory practices by the union:
"In substance we hold that the remedial machinery of the National Labor Relations Act
cannot be available to a union which is unwilling to correct past practices of racial dis-
crimination." Id. at 477.
72. Craver, supra note 34, at 33-39.
73. "SAVING PROVISION. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require
an individual employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor shall anything
in this Act be construed to make the quitting of his labor by an individual employee
an illegal act; nor shall any court issue any process to compel the performance by an
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strikes where abnormally dangerous working conditions are in fact
present, 4 a good faith subjective belief that a labor organization has
breached its duty of fair representation would not be sufficient. 5 An
objective demonstration of a violation would be a necessary prerequi-
site for protection of peaceful concerted activity "aimed at the preserva-
tion of [the employees'] protected right to employment justice."7 6
In addition to the difficulties of proof inherent in such a proposal,
other aspects of this approach reduce its utility as a viable method of
freeing employees from the constraints of majority representation. A
threshhold consideration is the standards which would be required for
the objective demonstration of fulfillment of the union's duty. If drawn
from present board criteria and judicial pronouncements 7 7 which re-
quire, under Vaca v. Sipes,78 a finding of arbitrariness and bad faith
on part of the union, there is a question of effectiveness of this ap-
proach, because the present test has made prosecution of unfair labor
practice charges and civil damage actions against unions quite diffi-
cult. 79
Even if a relaxed Vaca test is to be used, so that a per se viola-
tion of the union's duty would be established by a showing that the
union engaged in discriminatory practices without regard to defenses
of good faith and nonarbitrary motivation, other equally difficult issues
arise. There is an initial problem of deciding how discriminatory prac-
tices would be established. The board could apply Title VII case law
criteria" or the standards it has utilized in recent section 8 and section
9 cases."' In addition, the board would have to implement procedures
for prompt consideration of the union's alleged breach to supply the
employer with reliable facts upon which to base its response to picket-
ing that may threaten the continued existence of its business.
In the absence of such procedures, it is unlikely that the employer
could make a reasonably accurate judgment of the employees' claim
individual employee of such labor or service, without his consent; nor shall the quitting
of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous
conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be
deemed a strike under this Act." LMRA § 502, 61 Stat. 162 (1947).
74. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
75. Craver, supra note 34, at 54.
76. Id.
77. See notes 32, 33 supra.
78. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
79. See notes 55-57 supra.
80. See Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1972), va-
cated and remanded, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
81. See cases cited note 15 supra.
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to the right to bargain independently, since, as has been previously
noted,82 the employer's ability to acquire information regarding the un-
derlying dispute between the union and the minority dissidents is quite
limited. If the employer were simply to accept a union's assertion that
no discrimination had in fact been practiced and proceed to discharge
the dissidents, it would risk liability for back pay and reinstatement in
subsequent litigation involving solely intra-union affairs.1
3
If the employer's agreement with a majority union contained bind-
ing grievance and arbitration provisons, the employer's discharge of dis-
sidents could be deferred to arbitration under the board's expanded
Collyer"4 doctrine upon the filing of section 8(a)(1) and (3) unfair
labor practice charges. In that event, the union would be required to
defend the actions of the dissident minorities and, at the same time,
to maintain the absence of actual union discrimination. 5 If the dissi-
dents subsequently brought a Title VII suit against the union or em-
ployer, the weight to be accorded a prior board decision regarding the
presence of actual discrimination by the union would have to be deter-
mined.8 6 Finally, if the employer was convinced of the merit of mi-
nority contentions regarding actual union discrimination, definition of
the scope of separate negotiations would pose difficulties. Potential
bargaining issues extend from relatively narrow problems of alleged ra-
cial or sexual discrimination87 to all section 8(a)(5) mandatory bar-
gaining subjects. If a broad mandate were not given to the dissidents,
distinctions between issues of discrimination and all other subjects of
mandatory bargaining upon which they impact would greatly compli-
cate bargaining between the employer and two groups of employees.
Actual Discrimination by an Employer
An alternative solution would be to grant NLRA protection to un-
authorized concerted activites of minority union members, where it is
82. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
83. Even if the union could be made to share in the back pay provisions of re-
medial orders, the reinstatement obligations would, of necessity, apply solely to the em-
ployer.
84. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (1971).
85. The board has refused to defer to arbitration under Collyer rules when both
the union and the employer were hostile to the discharged employees and when the em-
ployees had consequently decided not to utilize existing grievance procedures. Western
Meat Packers, 198 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 80 L.R.R.M. 1743 (1972).
86. A similar determination would also have to be made with respect to the
board's review of an arbitrator's decision after deferral under Collyer.
87. Discriminatory practices based on age or religion would also have to be con-
sidered as possible mandatory subjects of bargaining.
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established that the employer has actually engaged in discriminatory
practices. It may be argued, however, that by sanctioning the action
of minorities under such circumstances, the board would be lending its
processes, and thereby becoming a party, to employment conditions
that are destructive of the very purposes of the NLRA. Nevertheless,
protection for concerted action directed against the wrongful conduct
of the employer can be supported on several grounds.
First, the board has extended NLRA protection to employee pro-
tests against serious employer unfair labor practices, notwithstanding
that such protests violated the no-strike ban in a collective bargaining
agreement, under the rationale that such protection was necessary to
preserve the prophylactic effect of the NLRA. 8s  Second, a constitu-
tional argument based upon the equal protection provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment can be made that, as a federal instrumentality,
the board is required to eschew any form of employer or union conduct
which would tend to perpetuate unlawful discrimination.89  In addition,
extending protection to unauthorized employee activity aimed at the
employer who has engaged in discriminatory practices places the bur-
den of the board's remedies on the responsible party. Finally, it has
been argued that the union should not have standing to complain about
the disruptive effect of minority bargaining upon its status as exclusive
representative, since the issue of unauthorized concerted activity would
not arise unless the union has been so unresponsive as to force the
minorities to take the independent actions for which the protection of
the NLRA is sought."
Fearing the attractiveness of the foregoing approach as a justifi-
cation for diminishing the authority of the union as the exclusive
representative, the board, in its Emporium brief before the Supreme
Court, squarely addressed its practical implications:
Neither the employer, the majority representative, nor the
dissident employees could determine their respective rights pros-
88. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 250 U.S. 270 (1955); cf. Poloron Prods.,
177 N.L.R.B. 435 (1969); Arlan's Dep't Store of Michigan, Inc., 133 N.L.RB. 802
(1961).
89. See text accompanying notes 40-41, 47 supra. See also 192 N.L.R.B. at
173-77 (member Jenkins, dissenting); 485 F.2d at 932 (Wyzanski, J., dissenting).
90. Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective Bargaining
Relationships, 79 Yta.E L.J. 46, 67 (1969). Where the union has been responsive and
supportive of the minority employees' protest, Gould would turn the Draper and Tanner
tests completely around and remove the protection of the NLRA from the employees'
conduct on the basis that the union has earned its exclusive representational status and
should not be bypassed, provided it has met other requirements such as having integrated
leadership. Id. at 67-68.
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pectively under such a scheme. In particular, the employer would
be placed in the position of running a serious risk of committing
an unfair labor practice no matter what he did to resolve the situa-
tion: taking reprisals against the dissident employees would violate
Section 8(a)(1) if their activities were subsequently held to be
protected; but bargaining with the dissidents would violate Section
8(a) (5) if their activities were unprotected. Thus any scheme
resting on retrospective determination of rights would tend to en-
courage inaction by the employer which might in turn lead to
strikes or other industrial strife.91
The board therefore rejected any proposal which keys on actual em-
ployer discrimination for the reason that the retrospective determina-
tion of rights cannot provide adequate standards for parties caught in
the Emporium dilemma.
Emporium Issues in the Future-Direct Negotiations
In spite of the Emporium Court's unequivocal support of the
principles of majoritarian collective bargaining through exclusive repre-
sentatives, the difficulties of assuring the fair representation of minority
rights must, before long, be addressed and resolved. Notwithstanding
its celebrated checks and balances, the majoritarian collective bargain-
ing process clearly has not been sufficiently responsive to minority
needs and concerns. Disallowing minority employees the right to
negotiate directly with an employer, where the same employees have
frustrated the very means by which a union sought to support their posi-
tion, is quite different from barring the door to any accommodation of
minority rights. In other words, while Emporium does reaffirm the
primacy of collective bargaining, it does not require that any fragmenta-
tion of the bargaining unit or reduction of the rights of the exclusive
representative be viewed as destructive of the collective bargaining
process.
The NLRA does not give the collective bargaining process its true
strength; rather the ultimate value of the process derives from the ag-
gregate self-interests of the employee community comprising the bar-
gaining unit. When there ceases to be a harmonious community of
interest within the bargaining unit, there is a concomitant loss of collec-
tive effectiveness that cannot be restored by the processes of the NLRA
alone. The lesson of the Emporium case, therefore, is not the impor-
tance of the collective bargaining system-that has long been ac-
cepted-but rather the breakdown of the presumed mutuality of
interest within the bargaining unit.
91. Brief for NLRB, 96 S. Ct. 977 (1975).
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Unlike participants in the electoral process, the bargaining unit
worker cannot change his registration periodically or bolt the party.
Unless he can muster support from the majority at appropriate times,
he will be locked into the bargaining unit for the duration of his work-
ing life with the employer, unable to change its leadership or to escape
its direction. The racial or sexual composition of the bargaining unit
may be altered by shifting housing or commuting patterns, or perhaps
by a court-imposed affirmative action plan, but the presumption of
mutuality of interest remains irrebuttable and provides the continuing
justification for the union's broad authority and discretion as exclusive
majority representative.
Yet the inescapable fact of Emporium was the lack of bargaining
unit harmony and the perception by some minority members that the
majority's interests did not coincide with their own. Moreover, their
dissatisfaction did not erupt from an unconscionable breach of the
union's duty of fair representation,92 nor from a recalcitrant employer
bent upon maintaining unlawful discriminatory employment practices."
Rather, the core dispute involved disagreement over the relative
effectiveness of the alternative means by which issues of alleged dis-
crimination could best be resolved. This area of disagreement was of
crucial significance to both the minority members and the union, since
disputes over tactics and timing can be as disruptive as disputes
over goals. Moreover, Title VII does not specify the remedies that
are required or appropriate to redress past wrongs. It is thus le-
gally possible for the Union and the dissidents to take different po-
sitions on the use of quotas, seniority systems, training programs
and other forms of affirmative action. 94
The minority employees in Emporium had no reason to believe
that the orderly processing of their claims of racial discrimination
through grievance-arbitration provided by the collective bargaining
agreement would yield more satisfying results than direct confrontation
92. "All the evidence indicates that the Union, [Hollins's and Hawkins's] duly des-
ignated bargaining representative, was endeavoring in every way available to it under
the agreement to adjust any and all cases of racial discrimination brought to its atten-
tion, and in at least one and apparently two cases had brought about the desired adjust-
ment." 192 N.L.R.B. at 185.
93. "Nor would I draw an inference of discrimination on the basis of the statistical
showing of hirings and promotions relating to minority groups without a comparable
showing of the ratio of applicants as between minority and majority groups and their
comparative qualifications, work records, and reasonable expectations of advancement.
In short, only a God-given expertise could substitute for this lack of evidentiary facts,
an expertise I do not possess and that could not be derived from the somewhat less sa-
cred precincts of officialdom." Id. at 184.
94. Note, 87 HAgv. L. REv. 656, 661-62 (1974).
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tactics and boycott pressures. The teaching of the Supreme Court in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver would hardly serve to encourage minor-
ities to place their full support behind the contractual grievance-arbitra-
tion procedures of the contract. Furthermore, the union would have
found it difficult to assemble objective evidence that the use of con-
tractual procedures in any specific industry had led directly to basic re-
forms in discriminatory employment practices, or that the utilization of
such procedures had equalled or exceeded the effectiveness of direct
negotiations and class actions under Title VII.
Nevertheless, by the inclusion of the nondiscrimination clause in
its contract, coupled with binding arbitration and no-strike provisions,
the union had not only foreclosed to itself all other direct avenues of
collective redress for the duration of the agreement, but had, as well,
prevented the minorities within the bargaining unit from choosing
other, and perhaps more effective, means."5 If, on the other hand, the
contract in Emporium had not contained a nondiscrimination clause,
and if grievances of a racial character were considered by the parties
to be beyond the scope of the arbitration and no-strike provisions, it
is possible that the union's duty of fair representation would have re-
quired it to resort to the activity advocated, and later engaged in, by
the minority employees.
Recognizing the right of unions to enter into agreements contain-
ing nondiscrimination clauses enforceable by arbitration and no-strike
provisions, and recognizing that the NLRA does not protect minority
concerted activity destructive of the exclusive representational status of
the union, it is imperative that procedures be developed whereby intra-
bargaining unit disagreements over the relative effectiveness of means
for redress of alleged discrimination can be resolved within the collec-
tive bargaining process. More importantly, where evidence suggests
that the presumed mutuality of interest has broken down or that the
respective self-interests of minority groups within a bargaining unit are
no longer compatible, procedures that deal with the representational
issues presented should be available. This is particularly important,
since neither charges of union unfair labor practices nor collateral
efforts to circumvent the union are likely to rekindle a mutuality of in-
terest within the bargaining unit where such an underlying consensus
no longer exists.
The basic shortcoming of the Emporium decision is its failure to
respond to the fundamental issues of majority representation of minor-
95. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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ity interests. The central question raised, but left unanswered, was the
extent to which the majority representative should be permitted to con-
tinue to serve as the exclusive arbiter and strategist of minority interests
when it is clear that the means and objectives espoused by the minor-
ities differ significantly from those of the majority. Absent a resolution
of this issue, the decision, while compelled by the procedural context
in which the lesser issues were litigated, 96 provides only an arid defense
of the forms of collective bargaining. The eventual success of collec-
tive bargaining as a means by which to advance the interest of minority
workers therefore will, however, depend upon the future willingness
of the board, the courts, and perhaps Congress to apply representa-
tional procedures to representational disputes.
The board could, for example, consider carving minority groups
out of larger units in much the same way that it utilizes the procedures
established in section 9(b) of the NLRA11 to determine units of profes-
sional9 or craft employees.99 Such a procedure for minority em-
ployees would certainly comport with the congressional mandate of sec-
tion 9 that the board determine bargaining units "in order to assure
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed
by this Act . . .,.oo Leaving aside constitutional principles of
"unique status," there is no reason why minorities should be entitled
to less identity and freedom of exercise than professional employees.
This proposal could be implemented by periodically affording members
of identifiable minority interest groups the opportunity, upon a 30 per-
cent showing of interest, to vote for organizations other than the
incumbent majority representative.
96. The sole issue before the Court was whether the employer had violated the
NLRA. Thus, the Court was foreclosed from determining the nature of the union's re-
sponsibility to represent minority members under such circumstances. See text following
note 69 supra. The issue of union responsibility did, however, greatly influence the de-
cision of the D.C. Circuit. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
97. Section 9(b) of the NLRA states: 'The Board shall decide in each case
whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guar-
anteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall
be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the
Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit
includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees
unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2)
decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a differ-
ent unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the
employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation .... 49
Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 143 (1947).
98. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958).




While such procedures might lead to the bargaining unit frag-
mentation feared by the Court in Emporium, that result would not
necessarily follow. Availability of such a process would induce
majority representatives to reform their policies and practices to retain
the participation of minority groups. Attenuation of bargaining
strength accompanying the reduction in bargaining unit size would also
serve as a brake on frivolous minority movements. Regardless of the
outcome, substantial advantages would be realized by establishing
orderly and prospective mechanisms to deal with unresolvable schisms
within the bargaining unit by determining representational rights on the
basis of current mutualities of interest.10 1
An approach of this type would obviously present new issues for
employers. Multiple labor organizations organized along racial lines
might confront the employer with conflicting demands for the same or
similar jobs. Separate and different collective bargaining agreements
might result from parallel bargaining with minority organizations.
Strike and picketing issues would have to be resolved, and new board
procedures would have to be developed, to ensure that employers con-
tinue to receive the basic protection afforded by the NLRA. Multiple
bargaining units and coordinated negotiations are, however, no longer
unfamiliar phenomena. Even employers with small or modest sized
operations are now accustomed to dealing with more than one labor
organization. It is also common that while negotiations with different
unions concern different jobs, the basic skill levels involved are often
virtually equal. Thus, parity considerations normally weigh heavily
upon positions taken by both the employer and the various unions at
the bargaining table.
The ultimate value of the foregoing approach as a method of deal-
ing with the fundamental issues in Emporium is less important than the
utility it may have in focusing attention on the gravity of these issues.
The absence of a consistent body of labor law principles by which these
issues can be adequately analyzed and the lack of procedures by which
they can be effectively resolved are serious deficiencies in the current
jurisprudence of labor relations. At the very minimum, thought must
be devoted to the rigid and outmoded board criteria applied to deter-
mine initial bargaining unit configurations, which thereafter serve to in-
101. Whether implementing this proposal would lead to racially segregated unions
is difficult to predict. It is equally difficult to predict what percentage of minority group
members would opt out of the majority unit in favor of a rival organization structured
along racial or sexual lines.
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sulate the designated representatives from shifts of employee interests
within the bargaining unit.
Innovative flexibility in board representational procedures is
particularly needed for intrabargaining unit disputes where it is clear
that the presumed initial mutuality of interest has dissolved, leaving the
unit deeply divided on fundamental issues. New principles and pro-
cedures must be developed to release minorities from the virtual
stranglehold that the majority representatives have upon the processes
of collective bargaining, if the hopes and aspirations of minority
workers are to receive the freedom of expression, within the system,
that is guaranteed by the NLRA. The binary principles of the NLRA
have served the needs of industrial America well, but they should not
be preserved at the cost of subordinating minority interests that diverge
materially from those of the majority.
Conclusion
Unless the collective bargaining process adjusts to the current and
immediately foreseeable forces at work within the modem industrial
bargaining unit, it will cease to be the primary vehicle for achieving
peace and stability in labor-management relations. The principles of
the NLRA must, therefore, be modified to accommodate the proliferat-
ing interest groups that have been formed to effectuate the new and
significant rights that have been mandated by Congress. These
emerging interest groups serve vital functions for their members in
much the same way that unions did at their inception, and they are not
likely to diminish in either size or importance in the near future.
The collective bargaining process cannot be allowed to lapse into
a state of inertia in which it serves only the interests of those that it
has placed in power. The continuing viability of the process and the
future importance of the NLRA depend not on the blessings received
from courts in decisions like that of Emporium, but upon the extent
to which collective bargaining under the NLRA remains faithful to its
historical purpose-the equalization
of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers
who are organized in corporate or other forms of ownerships asso-
ciation .... 102
The importance of the Emporium decision is not to be found in
its holding, but rather in the significant representational issues that
102. LRRM § 101, 61 Stat. 136-37 (1947).
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were not addressed by the Court and which therefore remain as
formidable future challenges for the board and courts. The continuing
ability of the "orderly collective bargaining process contemplated by the
NLRA '103 to promote industrial peace may well depend upon the
courage and vision with which these specific challenges are met.
103. 95 S. Ct. at 988.

